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This paper investigates the evolution of the (conditional) volatility of returns on
three Scandinavian markets (Finland, Norway and Sweden) over the turbulent
period of the past decade, namely the overlapping periods of financial liberalisa-
tion, drastically changing macroeconomic conditions and banking crisis. We find
that even over this relatively turbulent period volatility is in most cases success-
fully captured by past volatility and shocks to past volatility, ie by a (symmetric)
GARCH process. In each country banking crisis has induced regime shifts in (un-
conditional) volatility. We also find evidence for cross-country volatility spill-
overs during the banking crisis episodes. The estimated volatility patterns suggest
that even though the volatility of returns was of very high magnitude during the
years of banking crisis, developments within the banking industry were not re-
flected in market uncertainty until all the damage had been done and the severe
problems afflicting banks began to be realised in full.
Key words: GARCH, conditional volatility, banking crisis, volatility spillovers4
Osaketuottojen volatiliteetti pohjoismaisilla
osakemarkkinoilla
Rahoitusmarkkinoiden sääntelyn purkamisen ja
pankkikriisin vuosilta saatuja tuloksia




Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan kolmen Pohjoismaan (Suomi, Ruotsi ja Norja)
osakemarkkinatuottojen (ehdollista) volatiliteettia menneen vuosikymmenen ai-
kana, joka ajanjakso kattaa näissä maissa osin rahoitusmarkkinoiden vapauttami-
sen eri vaiheet, voimakkaasti muuttuneet makrotaloudelliset suhdanteet sekä
pankkikriisin. Huolimatta ajanjakson erityisluonteesta niin koko markkinoiden
kuin erityisesti pankkitoimialan tuottojen vaihtelua voidaan useimmiten parhaiten
selittää vaihtelun omalla historialla sekä vaihtelussa aikaisemmin tapahtuneilla
yllättävillä muutoksilla, so. (symmetrisellä) GARCH-prosessilla. Pankkikriisit
ovat aiheuttaneet regiiminmuutoksen (ei-ehdollisessa) varianssissa. Siitä huoli-
matta, että tuotot olivat estimoitujen volatiliteettirakenteiden mukaan hyvin vai-
htelevia koko pankkikriisin ajan, pankkitoimialan tapahtumat eivät yleisesti ottaen
heijastuneet volatiliteettiin ennen kuin pankkien ongelmat todella realisoituivat ja
pankkikriisi saavutti huippunsa.
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1  Introduction
Over the last two decades, there has been a plethora of research examining the
volatility of asset returns in general and its changing nature and predictability in
particular; see Bollerslev et al. (1992), and Bera and Higgins (1993) for detailed
literature reviews. Taking these features into account is crucial not only for under-
standing the behaviour of speculative markets, for most asset pricing theories and
risk management, but also from a wider economic viewpoint. The stability and
proper functioning of financial markets are nowadays regarded as a self-evident
necessary condition for balanced overall economic performance and steady eco-
nomic growth.
The objective of this study is provide additional insights into the dynamics of
modern asset markets by investigating and comparing the evolution and statistical
properties of the variance of three Scandinavian stock markets, namely those of
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Besides being relatively small market places and,
therefore, thin markets, these three markets provide an unusual and challenging
testing environment for the widely used parametric volatility models. The reason is
that the data of the past decade on these markets is generated in a highly special
economic environment, i.e., over the overlapping periods of financial liberalisation,
exchange rate turbulence, drastically changing macroeconomic conditions and
banking crisis. We examine whether, how and when the developments within
banking industries were reflected in the (conditional) volatility of the Scandinavian
stock returns during this turbulent period. Besides documenting the historical time
profile of risk, the present study has two specific objectives: we evaluate whether
banking crises have induced regime shifts in the volatility and whether there have
been cross-country spillovers in the volatility during the banking crisis episodes.
To investigate these issues, we examine stock returns at the market and
banking industry levels and apply to them a particular class of volatility models,
namely autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models.
1 These
models have proven useful for empirically modelling the evolution of return vola-
tility over time. As a comparison of different ARCH models is beyond the scope
of the paper, we take as our basic model the Generalized ARCH(p,q) model of
Bollerslev (1986), and augment it as follows. Firstly, we extend it by utilising a
version of Zakoian’s (1994) TGARCH-model to allow for potential asymmetry in
volatility. Asymmetry may well be present in our banking data as banks are highly
levered and therefore so-called leverage effect may show up as an asymmetric
response to shocks. Moreover, Zakonian’s model is nearly identical to that of Glo-
sten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), which Kim and Kon (1994) document to be
the best alternative for empirical stock market studies drawing on one model
specification. Second, we follow Lastrapes (1990) by considering the possibility
of regime shifts in the volatility. To this end, the possible non-stationary of the
unconditional variance due to the banking crisis episodes is accounted for. Fi-
nally, the basic GARCH-model is augmented in the spirit of Engle et al. (1990) to
allow for volatility spillovers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section we present
the econometric specification of the volatility models to be used in this paper.
Section 3 describes the data, and in Section 4 the empirical results are presented.
Section 5 concludes by briefly summarising the main results.
                                                
1 The ARCH-models build on the seminal work of Engle (1982).8
2  Basic Econometric Specification and
Estimation
Let 5W be the continuously compounded rate of return on a portfolio of stocks,
measured from (W-1) to W and ,W￿￿ the information available to investors at time
(W-1). Denote the conditional mean [W = ((5W ê ,W￿￿) and conditional variance KW =
9DU(5W ê ,W￿￿). The unexpected return at time W is eW = 5W-[W, which can be regarded
as a collective measure of news at time W (Engle and Ng 1993). An unexpected
increase in returns is an indication of the arrival of good news whereas bad news
is associated with an unexpected decrease in returns. A high absolute value of eW
signals the importance of incoming news.
In the present study, we take as our basic conditional variance specification
the following GARCH(TS) model:
å å = - = - + + =
S
M M W M
T
L L W L K
1 1
2
t  h b e a w (1a)
where a, b, and g are constant parameters. As noted in Bollerslev et al. (1992),
very low order specifications have been found to be successful in most empirical
implementations of GARCH models. Even over very long sample periods, such
parsimonious models as GARCH(1,1), GARCH(2,1) and GARCH(1,2) seem to
be sufficient.
To allow for asymmetry in volatility, the basic model (1a) is augmented by in-
cluding a dummy variable, GW￿￿, that takes the value of unity if eW￿￿ < 0 and zero other-
wise:
å å = - - - = - + + + =
S
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t  h b ge e a w (1b)
This is Zakoian’s (1994) threshold GARCH. In model (1b), asymmetry in volatil-
ity is inferred if g ¹ 0; leverage effect is present in the data if the estimated value
of g is positive.
GARCH models are typically estimated using maximum likelihood meth-
ods. Let the conditional mean be modelled as UW = eW. Then, after conditioning on




















where y is a vector of model parameters and where conditional normality of fore-
cast errors is assumed. A common empirical finding for financial time series data is
that the normality of conditional distributions is rejected. In such an environment,
Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimates (QMLE) are still consistent under the as-
sumption that the first and second moments of the standardised residuals can be
obtained (see Weiss 1986 and Bollarslev and Woldridge 1992). The result carries
also over to finite samples and valid inference regarding the QMLE of y (y
*, say)








  and  %(y
*) are the Hessian and the outer product of the gradients,
evaluated at y
*. Assuming a correct specification for KW and the conditional mean,
this variance-covariance estimator leads to a Wald statistic that has an asymptotic
chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis, irrespective of whether or not the
conditional density is normal.9
3  Data
The data set includes for each country a weekly value-weighted price index series
for the entire stock market and the banking sector. Due to data availability con-
straints, the Finnish data do not cover years when its financial markets were still
regulated but rather begin from the middle of the liberalisation process, i.e., from
the first week of January 1987. For Sweden and Norway the sample is from the
first week of January 1983 and therefore includes a sub-period of regulated capital
markets and the liberalisation period. The sample ends in the 22nd week of 1997
for each country. For further details of the data, see Table 1.
A caveat regarding the data is in order. The composition of banking indexes
(i.e., the particular institutions included in it) has changed during the sample period
due to the severe banking problems and industry restructuring. Moreover, govern-
ment interventions aimed at handling banking crises were extensive in each coun-
try, and in Norway, for instance, the state became a major owner of the banking
sector. These have affected the stock market data, and one should interpret the re-
ported results with these facts (among other things) in mind. A brief account of the
data environment and macroeconomic conditions is given in Appendix 1.
Table 1. 7KH'DWDZHHNO\
Finland Sweden Norway
Sample 1987(1)–1997(22) 1983(1)–1997(22) 1983(1)–1997(22)








Banking Index HEX Bank & Finance
Price Index
VA Banks Price Index OSE Banking Price
Index
The price indices for the entire market and the banking industry are displayed in
Figure 1. The price developments during the sample period are quite drastic. Even
though price changes for the banking sector differ (during post-crisis period) from
those for the entire market, a general pattern emerges. First, towards the end of
1980s, the prices boomed and then, at the beginning of the 1990s, they began to
decline (as macroeconomic conditions deteriorated and risks and problems begun
to materialise). The stock prices in Finland and Sweden began to decrease at least
two years before they reached their lowest level in 1992, which probably is the
darkest crisis year in these countries. For Norway, a somewhat different pattern
emerges. There stock prices did not recover from October ’87 crash until at the
beginning of 1989. During the latter half of year 1990, they then began to de-
crease again so as to hit their lowest value in 1991. During the latter half of the
1990s, i.e. during the post-crisis period, the markets have recovered and a new all-
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4  Empirical Results
We study the behaviour of weekly stock returns computed as a first logarithmic
difference from the relevant stock price index and measured in percentages. That
is, 5W = 100*ln(3W/3W￿￿) where 3W is the level of a price index at time W. We utilise
the procedure of Pagan and Schwert (1990) when constructing a measure of the
unpredictable element of stock returns. To filter out any predictability e.g. due to
non-synchronous trading, in the mean return, the raw return data, 5W, is regressed
on a constant and {5W￿M} with M = 1, 2,… ,8 (a two-month period). The residuals
from this regression, UW, are then the unpredictable part of stock returns.
We report descriptive statistics for these unpredictable returns in Appen-
dix 2. Several features of the pre-filtered return data stand out. First, by construc-
tion, the unconditional mean of UW is zero and there is no evidence of autocorrela-
tion in these pre-whitened series. Second, the unconditional standard deviation of
banking sector has in each country been higher than that of the whole market. A
visual inspection of the series reveal volatility clustering so that large (small)
changes inUW tend to be followed by large (small) changes of either sign. This is
also confirmed by the high values Ljung-Box statistics for the squared UW indicat-
ing that there are strong second moment dependencies. Finally, under the null of
normally distributed data the estimators of skewness and excess kurtosis are as-
ymptotically normally distributed with mean zero and variances 6/1 and 24/1,
respectively (1 = number of observations). The return distributions are strongly
leptokurtic, meaning that they have thicker tails than would be compatible with a
normal distribution. Unsurprisingly, then, normality is strongly rejected in all
cases. These findings are fully in line with the turbulent nature of the sample pe-
riod.
4.1  Estimation Results
In the estimation of (T)GARCH models, we started with the general specification
for the conditional variance as given by equation (1a) and (1b). When identifying
the final specifications, three criteria were considered. First, the properties of
standardised residuals were checked. As is well known, these should exhibit no
systematic patterns (i.e., they should be independent and identically distributed
with mean zero and variance one), if the model is not mis-specified. To this end,
the Ljung-Box statistics for the standardised residual and squared standardised
residuals of the models were, among others, computed. Second, if a nested version
of (T)GARCH -model seemed to be a successful candidate, the more constrained
model was tested against the general model by means of the log-likelihood ratio
test. Third, the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) was used to trade off a better
fit of a model for a more parsimonious model.
2
Table 2 presents the estimates of various GARCH models for the pre-
filtered market return and bank industry return series estimated using the entire
sample period. Interestingly, the best and most parsimonious specification for
market returns in each country is GARCH(1,1). The estimates of these models
                                                
2 Estimations were performed using Shazam version 7.0 and Eviews version 3.0. Different starting
values for parameters were used in all volatility estimations so as to ensure that a global maximum
was achieved.12
show that, using Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust covariance matrix, most of the
parameters of the variance equation are statistically significant at 5 % level. Thus,
even over this relatively turbulent period, stock market volatility is in these Scan-
dinavian countries successfully captured by a symmetric process and as a function
of past volatility shocks and of past conditional variances from the previous week.
As to bank return series, we find that for Sweden TGARCH(1,1) model ap-
pears to be more appropriate than any constrained version nested within it. Though
the coefficient of the asymmetry term is not statistically significant if judged using
its t-value, the likelihood ratio statistic rejected the null hypothesis of symmetry of
response. Also SIC suggested that TGARCH(1,1) should be preferred to
GARCH(1,1). For the Finnish bank returns, the null hypothesis of symmetric vola-
tility and constant mean cannot be rejected. The same applies to the Norwegian
bank returns. Thus, perhaps a bit surprisingly, a simple GARCH(1,1) model appears
to be the best specification for the Finnish and Norwegian banking sectors.
3
To evaluate the fit of these estimated models, several tests were performed.
Squared standardised residuals of all these models pass standard Ljung-Box tests
at 5 % significance levels. The Engle-type Lagrange multiplier tests for ARCH
effects in the standardised residuals did not reject the null of no such effects. Ex-
cept those of the Finnish banking sector
4, standardised residuals pass standard
Ljung-Box autocorrelation tests at 5 % significance level. The null hypothesis of
normally distributed standardised residuals is, however, rejected at 5 % level for
Swedish and Norwegian models. Given the turbulent nature of the episode, this is
not surprising. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the departures from normality
are mainly due to few extreme outliers and thus removable, say, by a small num-
ber of dummies. For instance, the models were not particularly sensitive to the
exclusion of October 1987 crash; the parameter values changed only slightly
when a dummy controlling for this event was included in the models.
5
                                                
3 To check the robustness of the reported results regarding asymmetry, the exponential GARCH
(EGARCH) of Nelson (1991) was also fitted to the return data. The estimated volatility exhibited
similar patterns as those reported in this paper with the exception that the null hypothesis of sym-
metric process was marginally QRW rejected in these estimations for the Swedish banking sector.
Whether markets as a rule respond differently to negative shocks than to positive shocks is a
somewhat open question. Following Black’s (1976) and Christie’s (1982) seminal studies on lev-
erage effect, Nelson (1991), Rabemananjara and Zakoian (1993), Zakoian (1994) and Koutmos
(1998) report evidence supporting the view that in large and developed stock markets negative
shocks to the market lead to larger return volatility than positive shocks of a same magnitude.
There is, however, some evidence that a duality between developed and not so developed stock
markets exists. In Shields (1997), for instance, no asymmetry in the volatility of returns was found
in the emerging markets of two East-European countries. Neither is there evidence for asymmetry
in the Chinese stock markets (Song et al. 1998). Interestingly enough, the asymmetry seems again
to be present in the Hong Kong stock market, according to the results reported in Henry (1998).
4 As to autocorrelation in the standardised residuals of the Finnish banking sector we make the
following remarks. First, the reported model was clearly the most parsimonious one, i.e., it mini-
mised SIC. Secondly, more complex volatility models (higher degree GARCH-models and the
like) did not remove the autocorrelation. Finally, the autocorrelation was removed when we
adopted a more complex pre-filtering process, that is, when a new set of unexpected returns was
generated and then its volatility estimated. Our conclusions remained qualitatively unchanged
when this other series was used.
5 To control for kurtosis, one could use t-distribution instead of the normal distribution. However,
in the present case the benefits from doing so are perhaps questionable, as it is likely that the kur-
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LogL -1256.122 -1469.456 -1711.395 -1886.022 -1756.760 -2064.394
L-B Q(16) 20.349 38.367 8.873 8.107 11.043 20.743
L-B Q
2(16) 13.384 20.215 2.708 8.350 4.934 9.604
ARCH(16) 14.671 23.241 2.445 8.920 7.057 9.825
Skewness -0.060 0.009 -0.970 0.377 -0.347 0.420
Kurtosis 3.376 3.448 11.072 5.2874 6.979 7.189
J-B 3.464 4.4690 2127.493 179.134 503.820 563.878
Wald test: H0: a+b=1 2.597 0.1166 5.694 1.239 2.693 -
Note: Robust t-ratios are given in the square-brackets [.]. ARCH(16) is the standard Engle-type
Lagrange multiplier test for conditional heteroscedasticity. J-B is the Jarque-Bera test for normal-
ity. L-B is the Ljung-Box portmanteau statistic testing for autocorrelation in the stand. residuals
(Q(16)) and in the squared stand. residuals (Q
2(16)), distributed as c
2(16). The 5% and 10% criti-
cal values for these tests are 26.269 and 23.542, respectively. Wald-tests are computed using the
robust Bollerslev-Wooldridge covariance matrix.
As Engle and Bollerslev (1986) note, GARCH models can be used to test whether
a time series is integrated in variance (IGARCH). In brief, this amounts to evalu-
ating whether the null hypothesis a + b = 1 can be rejected. To test for this null
hypothesis of variance non-stationary, a robustified Wald test is computed. This
procedure is justified by the results of Lee and Hansen (1994), which show that
even in the case of IGARCH, the QML estimator for GARCH(1,1) models has an
asymptotically normal distribution, provided that certain fairly loose conditions
hold. The results of this exercise are reported in the last row of Table 2. Clearly,
the results are mixed, and for instance at 10% significance level, the null of infi-
nite persistence in the estimated models cannot be rejected in two cases of six.
4.2  Accounting for Banking Crisis Regimes
Given the turbulent nature of the sample period, it is somewhat restrictive to sup-
pose that the constant in the (T)GARCH equation would not be subject to struc-
tural breaks. Lastrapes (1989) has for instance documented that the ARCH proc-
ess for exchange rates is not independent of U.S monetary policy. As past experi-
ence suggests that there is a relationship between the episodes of financial distress
and the level of asset price volatility, we now examine the possibility that the
banking crisis period shows up as a regime shift, i.e., as non-stationary of the un-
conditional variance.14
An obvious empirical strategy to investigate this contention is to consider
three non-overlapping sub-samples defined as pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis pe-
riods.
6 As to define the time lapse of banking crisis is somewhat arbitrary, we rely
on earlier literature when defining these sub-samples: according to IMF (see, e.g.
Lindgren et al. 1996 and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998), the banking cri-
sis period was 1991-1994 in Finland, 1987-1993 in Norway and 1990-1993 in
Sweden. These choices are in line with other interpretations/descriptions of the
peaks of these crisis periods (see, e.g., Kaen and Michelsen 1993, and Davis 1995,
1999). They also include the years when loan losses peaked in each country and
when a bulk of government interventions took place.
To allow for shifts in the variance constant and thereby in unconditional
variance, we estimate a more general variance model:
å å = - - - = - + + + + + =
S
M M W M W W
T





t  h b ge e a d d w (3)
where 'FW = 1 for observations in the crisis period and 0 otherwise and where 'SFW = 1
for observations in the post-crisis period and 0 otherwise. Note that equation (3)
amounts to (1) if dF = dSF = 0. The coefficients of the two dummies measure therefore
the change in the variance constant relative to that of the pre-crisis period (w). The
asymmetry term was included in the specification for the Swedish bank returns only.
As the estimation results do not differ significantly from those reported in
Table 2, we focus on the constants, dummy-variables and likelihood ratio statis-
tics; they are reported in Table 3. In Table 3 we also report Wald tests for the null
hypothesis of infinite persistence in variance in the general variance model of (3).
These are of interest since previous literature (see e.g. Lastrapes 1989) suggests
that the findings of infinite persistence in the conditional variance may be due to
structural shifts in the unconditional variance.
The results are implicative: the joint hypothesis that both during the crisis
and the post-crisis periods variance constant equals to that of the pre-crisis period
is rejected for the banking sector returns and the returns of the entire market.
Though not reported in the table, LR-tests rejected the hypothesis that the crisis
period variance constant does not by itself differ from the pre-crisis period, given
that the post-crisis period does; we were able to reject H0: dF = 0 ½ dSF ¹ 0 at 1 %
significance level.
7 The coefficient of 'FW is in all cases positive suggesting sig-
nificantly increased unconditional variance during the crisis phase; for the market
returns the unconditional variances over the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis
phases are as follows: Finland 4.435, 9.446, 8.923; Norway 4.560, 8.955, 2.847
and Sweden 6.871, 10.413, 4.956. A similar pattern emerged for banking industry
returns. We also experimented by inserting crisis and post-crisis dummies into
mean equations; these turned out not to gain significance. Finally, in all cases ex-
cept one the Wald test for H0: a+b=1 obtained higher values than in the case of
no-dummies in the model. This is in line with the findings of earlier studies.
                                                
6 In a recent paper, Kim and Kon (1999) however discuss the problems associated with using cal-
endar dates of economic events when modeling structural breaks. The danger is that the structural
change-points in variance are not detected accurately enough. They suggest a statistical detection
procedure should be used instead, which indeed might be a useful avenue for future research in the
present context.
7 LR-test statistics were 32.364, 16.100 and 50.456 for banking industry returns in Finland, Nor-
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Notes: LR-test is distributed as c
2(2). The 1 %, 5 % and 10 % critical
values for the test are 9.21, 5.99 and 4.61, respectively.
4.3  Volatility Spillovers and Banking Crisis
In this sub-section, we briefly examine whether there has been volatility spillovers
between the three Scandinavian stock markets during the IMF-defined banking
crisis episodes. The existence of spillovers would imply that shocks to the bank-
ing industry returns during a country’s banking crisis episode are transmitted to
the stock market of its neighboring countries. To test for spillovers, we adopt the
empirical strategy of Engle et al. (1990) in which the variance equation is aug-
mented by a predetermined intervening variable (see also Song et al. 1998):
2
1 , , 1 , , 1
2
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(4)
where subscripts V and Nrefer to country, i.eV, N Î {Finland, Sweden, Norway},
V ¹ N, and where 'N￿FW´e(EDQN)
2
N￿W-1 is the intervening variable of interest, i.e., the
IMF banking crisis dummy times the lagged squared banking industry residual
(error) of country N(at timeW-1).
8 Though not explicitly indexed, specification (4)
is used to model both the conditional volatility of the entire market as well as that
of the banking industry. When constructing equation (4), the banking industry
volatility of the previous week in the neighboring country has been treated as a
predetermined variable.
In this framework, a significant estimate of coefficient h would suggest a
spill-over effect of the banking crisis volatility in country N on the volatility of
country V. In other words, the coefficient h measures the impact of past banking
crisis shocks (to the banking industry returns) of country N on the conditional
stock market volatility of country V .  Notice, however, that when evaluating the
                                                
8 Notice that asymmetry is not allowed for in this specification; as the null hypothesis of symmetry
was rejected only for the Swedish bank returns, this restriction should not be of serious concern.
The results (regarding spillovers) for the Swedish banking sector are similar even if the asymmetry
term is included in the specification.16
Finnish market and its relationship between the Norwegian and Swedish market,
the sample period needs to be restricted to 1987-1997.
 In other words, only the
overlapping parts of the sample periods can be considered.
What’s more, there are several other ways to evaluate spillovers.
9 The one
adopted here should thus considered as an indicative exercise providing poten-
tially ‘stylized facts’ regarding spillovers and ideas for further research.
As the estimation results do not provide new insights when compared to
those obtainable from Table 2, only the LR-tests for the hcoefficientsare re-
ported in Table 4. At 5 % significance level, the results suggest on the one hand
that both the Norwegian and Swedish banking crisis shocks were transmitted to
the conditional volatility of the Finnish stock markets. The same applies to the
Swedish market, as shocks to the Finnish and Norwegian bank returns during their
respective crisis episodes were transmitted to it. The results hence imply that there
may have been a bi-directional causal relationship between the volatility of the
Finnish and Swedish stock markets during the banking crisis episodes. The Nor-
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Note: LR-test is distributed as c
2(1). The 1 %, 5 % and 10 % critical
values for the test are 6.63, 3.84 and 2.71, respectively. In the estima-
tions including the Finnish market, the overlapping part of the sample
is used, i.e. 1987–1997.
4.4  Estimated Volatility Patterns
The aim of this sub-section is to highlight whether, when and how the develop-
ments within banking industries were reflected in the conditional volatility of the
                                                
9 For instance, we evaluated causality (and spillovers) between the banking industry volatility and
the volatility for the entire market within each country. In such exercise it is important to recog-
nize that banks included in the banking industry index DUH constituents of the index for the entire
market. This implies a certain degree of “endogeneity” between the market index and the banking
industry index ZLWKLQ a country. We found a bi-directional relationship, which is likely due to the
described “endogeneity” problem. In addition to these tests, we performed standard Granger cau-
sality -tests using the estimated volatility series. The results suggested that no unidirectional rela-
tionship between the volatility of the entire stock market and the banking industry volatility could
be uncovered within a given country. This confirms the earlier finding (obtained using specifica-
tion (4)). Using Granger -tests and estimated volatility series, we also evaluated the nature of the
relationship between bank return volatility and return volatility of Dreal sector of the economy (as
opposed to financial firms). The indices in this experiment were metal and engineering sector
(Finland), engineering sector (Sweden) and industry (Norway). The results suggested that at 1%
significance level, both in Finland and Sweden the volatility of bank returns cause the volatility of
the representative real sector index but not the other way around. For Norway no such effects were
detected.17
Scandinavian stock returns over the turbulent period under scrutiny.
10 A question
of obvious interest is, for instance, is it the case that bank prices produced early
(and predictable) warning signals in the form of extreme volatility relative to the
entire market which banking regulators, among others, might have used when
assessing the health of the banking industry before the crisis actually hit?
Though the analysis of section 4.2 to some extent already addressed these
issues, we wish to shed additional insights by computing the ratio of the estimated
conditional standard deviation of bank returns to that of the entire market. Such a
“deflated” volatility series might reveal patterns that are specific to banking in-
dustry as it accounts for changes in general uncertainty. This is so because when-
ever the banking problems arise due to external shocks, then such surprises would
be observed in the general market index, too. These relative volatility series are
displayed in the Figure set of Appendix 3, together with vertical lines representing
for each country the IMF-defined crisis years.
As expected, clear evidence for drastically time-varying volatility is found
for all three markets. However, the timing of the periods of the most extreme
volatility (volatility peaks) seem to be relatively late, if judged on the basis that
they roughly coincide with the peak years of the crisis, i.e. with the years when all
the damage had been done and severe problems begun to realise on their full
scale.
11 As price levels had been strongly declining already during the earlier
years and as they were still declining during the volatility peaks, it seems that
during the periods of the most extreme volatility, there was a bulk of news sug-
gesting overpricing (negative returns). Apparently, the deepness of the banking
problems was to some extent a surprise. As we see it, the results from the analysis
of section 4.2 are in line with this interpretation. From this perspective, then, the
markets did not produce early warning signals in the form of high volatility but
rather adjusted only after hard news on realised risks came into the market.
12
                                                
10 Literature, which would utilise stock market data when examining the developments within the
Scandinavian banking industries over the liberalisation process and crisis episode, is almost non-
existent. The only study we are aware of is the one by Kaen and Michalsen (1993). In that study,
Norwegian stock market data are used, and the authors’ main interest is in detecting whether there
were market and industry wide contagion effects associated with financial distress announcements
of banking firms. A further question they address is whether investors recognised potential and
developing problems and valued bank stocks prior to the distress accordingly. The main results of
the paper are, firstly, that there indeed were contagion effects from commercial bank failures and,
secondly, that the severe problems of the industry were reflected in the stock market data only
after a number of banks had failed.
11 In the case of Finland and Sweden, foreign exchange market regime shifts, which were related
to more general economic pressures that these countries experienced at the time, seem to coincide
with the periods of the most extreme volatility of bank returns. Relative volatility series suggest
that even after controlling for market level reactions, bank returns were extremely volatile at the
time. At least in Finland, this could be regarded as a rational market response to the fact that dur-
ing the years of rapid lending expansions, many of the loans were dominated in a foreign currency.
This exposes bank customers, and thereby banks and even the whole economy, to exchange rate
risks since borrowers’ ability to repay the loans is at risk if a large devaluation of the home cur-
rency occurs.
12 At least two alternative standpoints can be taken on this result. On the one hand, a conventional
rational expectations explanation for asset pricing suggests that the most extreme pricing volatility
should occur during the years when most of the problem loans were incorporated into banks’ bal-
ance sheets (i.e. during the years of most rapid lending growth and booming economy). Or, at the
very least, it should occur before risks begun to realise on their full scale and before major inter-
ventions by regulators took place. On the other hand, there are at least two explanations why the
most extreme bank price volatility might not anticipate developing and forthcoming banking
problems. Firstly, there is evidence that modern banks are opaque business entities (Morgan 1999;
see also Pong et al. 1999). This may imply that market participants experience difficulties in inter-
preting and understanding the behaviour and risks of these firms. Secondly, structural breaks and
investors learning processes provide a reason why the most extreme volatility does not necessarily
precede the major events within the banking sector (Timmermann 1998).18
5  Conclusions
In this paper, we have applied standard GARCH model and augmented it in vari-
ous ways to investigate the conditional volatility on Finnish, Norwegian and
Swedish stock markets. In summary, the empirical results are as follows: First, a
relatively simple (T)GARCH model seems to be flexible enough to serve as a
general model for modelling conditional volatility even in turbulent markets. Sec-
ond, bank crisis seems to have induced regime shifts in volatility. Third, we find
evidence for cross-country volatility spillovers during the banking crisis episodes.
Finally, the analysis suggested that though the volatility of bank returns was found
to be of high magnitude during the years of the largest problems, the timing of the
periods of the most extreme volatility (volatility peaks) seems to be relatively late,
if judged on the basis that they roughly coincide with the periods when severe
problems begun to realise on their full scale.19
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Appendix 1.  Data Environment
The purpose of this section is to briefly highlight the developments at macroeco-
nomic level and within the banking industries in the three countries under scru-
tiny. The description that follows borrows rather freely from Dahlheim et al.
(1992), Kaen and Michalsen (1993), Koskenkylä (1994) and Murto (1996) to
which the reader is referred for further details and references.
In Figures 1–3 three central economic variables (GDP growth, consumer
price inflation and short interest rates) confirm the drastic nature of the changes
that each country during the sample faced. Three phases can roughly be distin-
guished for each economy: first, during the1980s, growth was rapid and interest
rates remained at relatively high levels. Second, for each country there were signs
of accelerated inflation and overheating. In Norway, this occurred somewhat ear-
lier than in Finland and Sweden; in these two countries consumer prices rose rela-
tively rapidly towards the end of the 1980s and GDP growth reached its peak
about at the same time. Third, the economic problems of Finland and Sweden
began in the early 1990s; inflatory pressures disappeared and growth rates shrank.
Finally, as economies began to recover, interest rates started a steady decline.
A view on banking sector developments during the sample period can be
based on Figures 4–6. The figures for lending growth, bank profitability (ratio of
operating profits to average assets) and asset quality (ratio of loan losses to aver-
age assets) portray a clear picture on the developments within the sector. After the
liberalisation process, lending increased rapidly and in each country, there were
years when lending growth exceeded 25 %. Then, during the crisis years, aggre-
gate lending diminished and lending growth rates became negative. Profitability
remained relatively stable until the beginning of 1990s when the largest problems
and risks finally realised and the crisis hit. The severity of banks’ problems is evi-
dent from the time-series of loan losses. The ratio of loan losses to average assets
reached its peak in 1991 in Norway and in 1992 in Finland and Sweden.
At a general level, the background of the crises had certain parallels of
which the two most important ones were as follows. First, financial markets were
de-regulated in each country fairly rapidly, which, together with increased com-
petition on the part of other financial institutions, lead to competition for market
shares and, as we just observed from Figures 4–6, to very fast lending growth. In
Norway the financial markets were liberalised by the end of 1984 while in Finland
and Sweden this occurred a year or two later. A characteristic feature of the years
of rapid credit expansion was, as we now with the benefit of hindsight know,
‘bad’ credit screening practises within banks and, to some extent, ‘bad policies’
(almost no attempts to control the expansion were made). Second, macroeconomic
conditions contributed to the development of the crisis in each country; in Nor-
way, perhaps the most important factor affecting the economy was the decline in
oil prices in 1985–1986, whereas in Finland the collapse of the trade with Soviet
Union during the last years of 1980s provided the start for deteriorating economic
performance. In Sweden no single factor has been identified even though the gen-
eral decline in the growth of export markets and a tax reform (leading to higher
post-tax interest rates) have been mentioned as contributing factors.
The problems that had been accumulating for years started to emerge on
their full scale in 1987 in Norway and achieved their climax in 1991. In fact, early
evidence on the potential problems appeared as early as in 1986 when commercial
bank loan losses rose by 75 per cent. In Finland and Sweden the problems begun
to materialise later and 1991 is the year when banks’ financial problems became
truly apparent. In Finland, however, one of the first signs of the developing prob-22
lems was perhaps the restructuring programme of the Skopbank (initiated by the
Finnish banking authorities) in October 1989. In Sweden, the large increase in
credit losses of deposit banks in 1990 could be regarded as one of the first unam-
biguous signals about the condition of the banking sector.
In each country, not only were the commercial banks involved in the proc-
ess but the savings banks encountered, if possible, even more severe problems.
Also in each country, the role of government intervention was important as the
crisis unfolded. Murto (1996) reports that the total amount of the bank support
granted by the governments in 1989-1993 was 14.7 % in Finland, 4.5 % in Nor-
way and 6.2 % in Sweden as a percentage of GDP. In Finland and Sweden most
of the banks remained in the private hands while in Norway the government ef-
fectively took over all the major commercial banks. Both in Sweden and in Fin-
land the governments made it more or less clear that a) the state had no incentives
to become an owner of the banks and that b) the stability of the banking system
was guaranteed under all circumstances.
1 In Norway, the policy was different and
for instance in October 1989 a commercial bank was taken under state control for
the first time since 1928. In October 1991, the Norwegian state became the sole
owner of the second and third largest banks and the major owner of the largest
bank.
To complete the description, a very selective list of certain major events re-
lated to banking crisis and foreign exchange market turbulence is given:
Finland: i)”Autumn 1990” = the incident of drawing up a restructuring pro-
gramme (by the authorities) for a large commercial bank (Skopbank)
in October 1990; ii) “Autumn 1991” = the third week of September
1991 was the week when the market confidence on Skopbank finally
collapsed and when the consequent take-over of the bank by the Bank
of Finland took place; the devaluation of markka in October 1991; iii)
”Autumn 1992” = the event of letting the markka float in September
1992.
Sweden: i) “Spring 1990” = Swedish commercial paper crisis, i.e. collapse of
market liquidity and issuance; ii) ”Spring 1991” = (roughly) the first
announcements of very large credit losses for the accounting year
1990 by Swedish banks in April 1991; iii) “Autumn 1992” = the nulli-
fication of the share capital of the smallest of Sweden’s large com-
mercial banks (Gota Bank) in September 1992; The event of letting
the Krona float at the end of November 1992.
Norway: i) ”Autumn 1988” = the announcement that two Norwegian savings
banks (Sparebanken Nord and Tromso Sparebank) were found to have
lost their equity capital and that their administration was taken over by
the authorities in October 1988; ii) “Autumn 1991” = the event of
government taking over the second largest Norwegian commercial
bank (Kreditkassen) on 14th October 1991; iii) “Winter 1991” = the
event of writing down the original share capital of two major Norwe-
gian commercial banks (Fokus Bank and Den Norske Bank) during
the first week of December 1991.
                                                
1 This was explicitly announced in February 1993 in Finland. In Sweden the parliament gave quar-
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Appendix 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Unexpected
Stock Return (UW)
Finland Norway Sweden
Sample size 532 741 741
Mean
  Market return
  Bank return
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Note: The entries in the table are computed for unexpected weekly returns. J-B is the Jarque-Bera
test for normality. L-B is the Ljung-Box portmanteau statistic testing for autocorrelation in the
returns (Q(16)) and in the squared returns (Q
2(16)), distributed as c
2(16). The 5% and 10 % criti-
cal values for these tests are 26.269 and 23.542, respectively.26
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